Timothy Garton Ash skewers some of the old cliches chucked around when talking about US/UK relations.
‘ … take the very serious danger of an Israel-hating, unstable Islamic Republic of Iran getting the nuclear bomb, and the associated risk that Washington will bomb Iran first, with likely disastrous consequences in the region. (For the avoidance of any misunderstanding: no shred of moral equivalence between Tehran and Washington is implied.)’
Ash’s answer is:
‘What can Britain do about this? The classic Tory answer is: use our fabled “special relationship”. Get on the blower to Washington. One tries to imagine the call. David Cameron: “Look here, George old chap, we really don’t think it’s a good idea to bomb Iran. And I have to say, you couldn’t count on the RAF.” George Bush (for it is he) turns to vice-president Dick Cheney: “Hey, Dick, David says we shouldn’t bomb Iran.” Cheney: “Well, gee, if Petraeus says that, maybe we should think about it.” Bush: “Not David Petraeus, David Cameron.” Cheney: “David who?”‘
T.G.A. is right to identify the rhetorical appeal to the concept of ’specialness’ in this transatlantic relationship as a tool of British politicians. Its effectiveness and success has been varied and it has often been little more than a figleaf to hide the poverty of British power. Britain’s global stature is out of proportion to its current standing in the power stakes thanks to – amongst other things – membership of the Permanent UN Security Council and G7, financial sector expertise and a first-class diplomatic service.
Timothy Garton Ash comment on ‘Special Relationship’
October 4, 2007
http://politics.guardian.co.uk/conservatives/comment/0,,2182980,00.html
Timothy Garton Ash skewers some of the old cliches chucked around when talking about US/UK relations.
‘ … take the very serious danger of an Israel-hating, unstable Islamic Republic of Iran getting the nuclear bomb, and the associated risk that Washington will bomb Iran first, with likely disastrous consequences in the region. (For the avoidance of any misunderstanding: no shred of moral equivalence between Tehran and Washington is implied.)’
Ash’s answer is:
‘What can Britain do about this? The classic Tory answer is: use our fabled “special relationship”. Get on the blower to Washington. One tries to imagine the call. David Cameron: “Look here, George old chap, we really don’t think it’s a good idea to bomb Iran. And I have to say, you couldn’t count on the RAF.” George Bush (for it is he) turns to vice-president Dick Cheney: “Hey, Dick, David says we shouldn’t bomb Iran.” Cheney: “Well, gee, if Petraeus says that, maybe we should think about it.” Bush: “Not David Petraeus, David Cameron.” Cheney: “David who?”‘
T.G.A. is right to identify the rhetorical appeal to the concept of ’specialness’ in this transatlantic relationship as a tool of British politicians. Its effectiveness and success has been varied and it has often been little more than a figleaf to hide the poverty of British power. Britain’s global stature is out of proportion to its current standing in the power stakes thanks to – amongst other things – membership of the Permanent UN Security Council and G7, financial sector expertise and a first-class diplomatic service.